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This review of the literature on the relationships between
financing and output in the not-for-profit (NFP) hospital considers the
extent of the influence that financing has on the character of the NFP
organization and the extent to which the availability of particular types
of financing affects outputs. We also investigate whether characteristics
of hospital outputs can affect the availability of financing. Our motivation
in presenting this article is our view that the capital formation and capital
structure of the health care industry are important determinants of the
cost, quality, types, and distribution of the services it provides. Further,
government expenditures, taxation, and policies toward debt and equity
markets can have a significant influence on capital financing and capital
formation.
The importance of capital formation and financing is obvious. Coh-
odes (1983) has detailed the magnitude of the capital question. Over the
current decade perhaps over 100 billion dollars will be spent on hospital
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capital. According to the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission
(1987), capital costs continue to increase faster than total costs. Since 1980,
capital costs as a percentage of total costs have risen from 6.2 percent to
8.4 percent. Several reasons for this increase are cited, including inflation
in the cost of equipment and plant, cost-increasing technological change,
and the substitution of capital for labor in the production process. But a
fundamental understanding of how to influence capital financing and
expenditures while protecting and improving the character of health care
services is lacking.
Such an understanding is crucial to a responsible evaluation of sev-
eral policy debates, currently raging, that are likely to influence the well-
being of not-for-profit hospitals and their continued ability to provide
services. One of the most visible of these debates is whether NFP hos-
pitals deserve to retain their tax-exempt status. Many state and local gov-
ernments, in particular, are reexamining the decision to grant NFP hospitals
exemption from the obligation to pay income and property taxes. Tax
exemption and the legal recognition of the charitable purpose of hospitals
permit persons making charitable contributions to take an income tax
deduction, thereby stimulating the flow of contributions. This challenge
to tax-exempt status derives from a perception that NFP hospitals have
pulled back from their commitment to provide charitable services and
have begun to act very much like commercial enterprises. Some have
argued that there are no differences between the operations of NFP hos-
pitals and those of proprietary hospitals, which are not accorded exemp-
tion from taxation (Sloan and Vraciu 1983). Others have argued that health
care providers in general are no longer motivated by charity or a desire
to be of service as much as they are driven by the same profit motive
that defines any typical enterprise in our economy (Herzlinger and Kras-
ker 1987).
A second policy debate bearing less directly on the NFP hospital
revolves around fiscal federalism and volunteerism-concepts promoted
by the Reagan administration. These concepts hold that the expansion of
federal government programs has displaced local government and, in par-
ticular, private sector support for socially worthy causes. This &dquo;crowding-
out&dquo; of private contributions to social causes by government could be
reversed by a reduction in governmental support for these same causes.
A reduction in government financing would stimulate private &dquo;crowding-
in.&dquo; The existence of crowding-out and crowding-in would be a strong
argument for reduced governmental support for social programs. Fiscal
federalism and volunteerism applied to the hospital would mean reduc-
tions both in government payments for services and in the availability of
government funds for asset acquisition. Funds for NFP hospital asset
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acquisition have pretty much vanished; government payments for serv-
ices are being tightly controlled. The result is that the hospital is search-
ing for other sources of financing for patient care, such as donations for
charity care, and for other means of financing asset acquisition, such as
debt. Whether crowding-out and crowding-in do occur depends on the
motivations of donors and on the response of the hospitals to donations.
A third policy question concerns whether Medicare, Medicaid, and
other large purchasers of care will continue to pay the hospital a price
that covers the full cost of acquiring assets, including the cost of financing
the assets purchased. The cost of financing assets includes the interest
expense on debt and the required return to equity. Most third party
payers still pay for debt expenses on a cost-incurred basis-a policy that
may have influenced the financing and investment decisions of the hos-
pital. Changing the manner in which these expenses are paid for, there-
fore, will likely influence future investment and financing decisions of the
hospital. To the extent that these decisions affect the character of hospital
output, a change in capital payment methodology is important. Medicare
is committed to a phasing out of cost-based payments for these expenses.
The prospective payment prices are to be increased by a percentage rep-
resenting approximately the average ratio of capital-related expenses to
operating expenses experienced by all hospitals. The debate revolves
around whether the price increase to cover capital-related expenses should
include a component representing the cost of equity capital as well as the
cost of debt capital. Assuming all other payments were at average cost,
such a policy would generate accounting profits for the average hospital.
Failure to cover the full economic costs of financing in the regulated prices
would cause the average hospital either to reduce its stock of assets or to
increase its proportion of debt financing in the long run, and would likely
alter the quantity and types of hospital outputs.
A fourth important policy debate questions whether NFP hospitals
should continue to have access to tax-exempt debt financing. This access
is believed to have stimulated the use of debt and to have reduced the
cost of financing and thereby the cost of providing care. On the other
hand, this tax subsidy has reduced government tax revenues and may
have stimulated excess capital expenditures by hospitals. From a public
policy perspective, the answer to this question depends on the relative
social benefits and costs of this tax-free debt. The costs of tax-free debt
are fairly easy to conceptualize and measure in terms of tax collections
forgone and a reallocation of resources. However, the benefits depend on
how access to tax-exempt debt affects the amount and characteristics of
the output of the NFP hospital.
All of these policy debates are related to the issue of capital financing
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of the NFP hospital. The answers found in resolving these debates will
have an important influence on the capital structure of the NFP hospital
and will potentially affect the cost, quality, mix, and distribution of hos-
pital services. Therefore, the conduct of the debates should be based on
an understanding of the relationships between financing and the behav-
ior of the NFP hospital.
The discussion in this article concentrates on long-term sources of
financing for the NFP hospital. These long-term sources include dona-
tions, government grants, and retained earnings as sources of equity, as
well as taxable and tax-exempt debt. In addition, some sources of short-
term financing are covered, including lump-sum operating donations,
current-period profits, and government grants for the purchase of charity
care. The discussion will focus on how the availability and cost of these
financing sources relate to several aspects of the output of the NFP hos-
pital, including the quantity, cost, and distribution of hospital products.
At the outset, it is important to note that no studies address all of
the policy issues-or even more than one or two, to our knowledge. The
bulk of the literature reviewed comes from the fields of economics and
finance, with the remainder drawn from more traditional medical care
and hospital administration sources. In all cases this literature is relatively
recent, with few citations dating from before the mid-1970s and the ma-
jority published within the past five years. The many gaps in the literature
and avenues for future research are highlighted.
We begin by surveying the literature that describes the behavior of
NFP hospitals without considering financing issues. Many of these stud-
ies serve as the foundation for further work on financing. The first papers
reviewed that concern financing are those that focus on donations as the
sole or principal source of financing for NFP firms. Next, we consider the
literature that includes both donations and government financing. The
subsequent section covers literature that incorporates internally generated
funds as a source of short-term and long-term financing. Finally, we look
at papers that analyze the implications of debt financing. Throughout this
article, we explore the policy relevance of the literature reviewed. A con-
clusion summarizes some of the findings and policy implications, and
suggests areas for future research.
HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR
Before considering how various sources of financing relate to hos-
pital behavior, we present some of the models developed to describe
hospital behavior in general. Most early models of hospitals do not in-
clude financing, but do consider many aspects of hospitals’ behavior,
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such as their quantity and quality of output, and their level of technology
employed. These same aspects of behavior are of interest in models of
hospital financing. General models of hospital behavior that do not con-
sider financing serve as foundations for models that do.
Since the focus here is on not-for-profit hospitals, analysis using the
usual behavioral assumption of profit maximization may lead to erro-
neous results. Similarly, cost minimization, the profit-maximization cor-
ollary in competitive markets, may not be appropriate, because of both
the not-for-profit nature of the hospital and the lack of competition in
many hospital markets. The possible inadequacy of traditional profit-
maximizing-cost-minimizing economic models in the case of the hospital
industry has led to much speculation and research. An overview of the
theories that do not involve financing issues is provided here. Subsequent
sections introduce models that explicitly include various sources of fi-
nancing, some of which are based on these more general models.
Among the many overviews of economic models of hospital behav-
ior are those by Davis (1972), Jacobs (1974), and Joseph (1974). Jacobs’
review classifies models of hospitals into six types. The first two types
of models treat the hospital as a quantity or quality maximizer. These
models translate the objective function of the various managers into the
goals of the firm. Rice (1966) and Lee (1971), in the specific case of hos-
pitals, and Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1973), for firms in general, are
representative of these two types of models. These models generally follow
the same structure as traditional economic models, but for profit they
substitute total output or a proxy for quality, such as total number of
inputs or proportion of labor inputs. Quantity maximization is frequently
used as a goal for models of hospitals that involve financing. The result
of having this as a goal is typically that the hospital acquires financing
for as many projects as possible with no concern for the specific purpose
of the project involved other than the production of more output. The
characterization of the hospital is limited to the quantity it produces,
which is determined by the amount of financing it is able to secure.
Quality maximization is used less often in models that include fi-
nancing, perhaps because of the difficulty involved with defining quality.
While output ordered on the basis of the quantity of labor or capital used,
or the labor-capital ratio, can be used as an indicator of quality, financing
models have not offered these interpretations.
A third type of model maximizes the joint objective of quantity and
quality. This is the type of model used by Newhouse (1970) and Feldstein
(1971) to describe, respectively, the price-cost structure of hospitals and
hospital price inflation. The joint objective allows Feldstein (1971) to trace
much of the increase in costs and prices of hospital inputs from the
260
demand for the increasingly higher quality of care provided by hospitals.
While the methodology employed in these models is not generally found
in financing models, the predictions regarding hospital costs and prices
are often cited and used as a basis for comparison.
The standard objective of profit maximization has been applied to
hospitals by Davis (1972). While maximizing quality may be the &dquo;true&dquo;
objective of the hospital, maximizing net cash flows can be considered
an intermediate step.to maximizing quality. These cash flows can be used
to purchase new equipment or better facilities, thus satisfying the final
objective. As will be mentioned in a later section, this objective has also
been used to explain the more recent issue of &dquo;cost shifting,&dquo; which stems
from hospitals’ discretion in accounting and pricing practices and in their
use of profits. Danzon (1982) and Dittman and Morey (1981) have devel-
oped models, also based on profit maximization, to explain the presence
of cross-subsidization of services within hospitals. Harris (1979), how-
ever, derives similar results in assuming that hospitals maximize social
welfare.
Pauly and Redisch (1973) characterize the hospital as an exchange
institution that maximizes the profits of the doctors instead of the hos-
pitals’ profit. Since doctors control many of the patients’ decisions con-
cerning the joint production of physician and hospital services, doctors
can maximize their own net income by efficiently using the hospital as
an input. The exchange type of model has financing implications by es-
tablishing motivation for conflicts between the hospital and its bond-
holders. This conflict as well as methods of conflict resolution are discussed
in the section on debt financing.
The sixth and final type of model of the hospital is as a trustee-
manager exchange organization. Clarkson (1972) describes a behavioral
theory of the hospital much like Simon (1978) did for firms in general.
This type of model allows for conflicts between the suppliers of financing
and the manager of the hospital, and possibly for the resolution of these
conflicts. Rose-Ackermans (1987) model of hospital financing and behav-
ior considers this type of conflict by suggesting that managers and donors
may have different preferences for the type of output produced. Financing
from specific sources may act as a constraint on hospital behavior.
Each of the six general types of model was designed to explain par-
ticular empirical results or observed behavior. Therefore, more than one
model may be relevant, depending on what one is interested in knowing
or predicting about hospitals. Young and Saltman (1983) and Sloan and
Becker (1981) have suggested that an accurate, all-encompassing frame-
work within which to view the hospital may be difficult to describe
because of the many different functions and outputs of the hospital and
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because the organizational structure of the hospital itself may be endog-
enous to the system of constraints imposed upon the hospital. Pauly
(1987a) has noted that empirically testing among the many competing
theories is extremely difficult.
Again, none of the preceding models deals with issues of hospital
financing and the behavior of the hospital under differing financing ar-
rangements. However, some of the papers reviewed in the following sec-
tions use the more general models of hospital behavior as a starting point
or as a reference. The predictions of the various models of hospital be-
havior may vary due to differing financing arrangements. This type of
comparison among models has not been undertaken and would appear




We begin our review of the literature relating financing to NFP
hospital output by considering those studies that focus on private do-
nations as the source of financing. This approach is exemplified by the
early work of Weisbrod (1977). Weisbrod conceptualizes NFP firms as
entities whose purpose is to provide collective goods that neither the for-
profit sector nor the government produces; he considers NFP firms to be
extragovemmental providers of collective-consumption goods. Donors
perceive the output of the NFP firm as having public goods aspects, that
is, as benefiting the community in general. The NFP firm comes about
because of concern over the suboptimal consumption of a collective good.
Persons donate to establish and maintain the firm because it provides
goods that they value. Financing comes mainly from donations by persons
who care about the consumption of a particular good, as well as from
government subsidies. While this point is only implicit in Weisbrod
work, the firm provides the valued good as a return on the investment
of the donors. -
Weisbrods work describes the role of the NFP firm in a donor fi-
nancing situation. However, he does not address directly the important
issues of why people donate and what they expect in return for their
donation. In addition, Weisbrods work does not consider whether the
firm has objectives-apart from those of the donors-that might influ-
ence behavior. 
’
Becker (1974) earlier developed a model of donations behavior based
on the individuals maximization of a utility function that includes the
person’s own consumption and the consumption of others about whom
the person cares. Beckers model predicts that donations are highly re-
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sponsive to income (income elastic) and sensitive to income tax deduct-
ibility (price elastic). The tax deductibility of donations lowers their effective
price, thereby encouraging donations. Additional donations enable the
NFP firm to produce more services.
Several studies have contributed to our knowledge about the price
elasticity and income elasticity of demand for donations. Feldstein and
Taylor (1976) use data from 1962 and 1970 tax files to explore the price
elasticity of demand for donations. Although their estimates vary by year
of data and by income and age classes, average price and income elastic-
ities of demand are -1.28 and 0.7, respectively.
Reece (1979) summarizes the work of Feldstein and Taylor (1976)
and others: (1) the income elasticity of demand for contributions is esti-
mated to be less than unity, meaning that a 10 percent increase in income
induces an increase in contributions of something less than 10 percent;
(2) the price elasticity of demand is estimated to exceed unity in absolute
value, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the price of contributions,
which might be caused by a change in income tax deductibility, would
induce a reduction in contributions of more than 10 percent; (3) there is
support for the utility-interdependence hypothesis of Becker; and (4) there
are different price and income elasticities for different goods. Recces own
empirical study finds an income elasticity in excess of one. He finds that
income tax deductibility is an important determinant of the level of con-
tributions. And he finds little support for the utility-interdependence hy-
pothesis. Reece also finds that the effects vary by the type of donation
(to charity, religion, education, politics, etc.), and that the results are very
sensitive to empirical specification.
Other investigations of the price elasticity of demand have generally
found similar results. Reece and Zieschlang (1985) have . generated esti-
mates of the sensitivity of charitable contributions to tax deductibility.
Their estimates are consistent with the work of Reece (1979) and of Weis-
brod and Dominguez (1986), and indicate a great deal of sensitivity to
price and tax deductibility. A very recent reestimation by Feenberg (1987)
finds a price elasticity of -1.63, which provides further evidence that the
demand for donations is generally price elastic.
Sugden (1984) focuses directly on the financing of voluntary NFP
firms through donations and on the reasons why people donate. His
model, a reciprocity model, predicts that people will contribute to the
production of a public good in proportion to the level of support provided
by others in the community. Further, it predicts that individuals contrib-
ute only toward the production of those public goods from which they
can derive benefits and not toward other public goods. This conclusion
is consistent with Reeces empirical finding of little support for the utility-
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interdependence hypothesis. Sugden goes further than Weisbrod in ex-
amining the motivations for giving, but from the perspective of the re-
lationship between financing and outputs, he essentially reaches the same
conclusion-that the preferences of the donors determine the output of
the firm. Neither Weisbrod nor Sugden considers the possible influence
of firm objectives and constraints on outputs or the effects of nondonor
financing.
All of the studies reviewed so far in this section have focused on
the motivation and expectations of donors. Little work, in fact, has been
published that ties the behavior of the firm to these expectations. Rose-
Ackerman (1982) and Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) are among the first
to examine whether or not firm behavior with respect to output affects
the supply of donations. Rose-Ackerman starts with a model where NFP
managers operate to maximize donations net of fund-raising costs. She
develops her theory around the preferences of the donor. In her most
sophisticated model, donors value their own consumption and give gifts
to charity based upon the output characteristics of the charity, the number
of people served by the charity, and fund-raising costs. Donors dislike
fund-raising costs but value the productivity of such activities in increas-
ing donations. This model predicts the result found by Weisbrod and
Dominguez that fund-raising expenditures will be made up to the point
where the marginal net contribution is zero. While Rose-Ackerman’s con-
clusions focus on the effects of fund-raising expenditures on donations,
her modeling of donor financing as dependent on some specific output
behaviors of the firm represents an advance over previous work.
Weisbrod and Dominguez go a step further in hypothesizing that
the supply of donations is positively related to the quality and quantity
of output produced by collective-good providers, as well as to fund-rais-
ing expenditures. Fund-raising expenditures are hypothesized to have
two countervailing effects on the level of donations-they increase con-
tributions by reducing information costs for donors, but they also de-
crease contributions by increasing the price of giving. In their empirical
testing of these ideas, the authors develop a measure of the net price of
a contribution as a function of the donors marginal tax rate and the ad-
ministrative and fund-raising expenditures of the firm. For hospital firms,
their empirical results show that the price elasticity of demand is greater
than one in absolute value, indicating again that donors are very sensitive
to net price. The total elasticity of donations with respect to fund-raising
expenditures, including the effect on price, is not significant. The authors
interpret this result to suggest that NFP firms spend money on fund-
raising up to the point where the marginal net contribution to revenue
is zero. Therefore, they may be maximizing total expenditures. Weisbrod
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and Dominguez also find donations to be positively related to the age of
the firm, which they speculate may be a measure of the extent to which
the firm provides the quality and quantity of output it claims to provide.
As was true of Rose-Ackerman, Weisbrod and Dominguez do not con-
sider the effects of specific outputs on the level of donations.
Most of the papers that focus on donations as financing for NFP
firms identify a distinct and important role for the NFP hospital in pro-
viding public goods. Further, the NFP hospital cannot continue to exist
if it does not adequately fulfill its social purpose. The fact that NFP hos-
pitals continue to receive charitable contributions is evidence that they
provide public goods. One possible policy implication of this literature
is that government should continue to provide some financial support to
the NFP hospital, that is, to finance a part of the production of the public
good. This support could take the form of maintaining tax-exempt status,
which would continue to allow donors a tax deduction. Most studies
reviewed report that tax deductibility is an important determinant of the
amount donated. Whatever mechanism is established for government
support, determination of the level of governmental financial aid should
be based on an understanding of the relationship between government
financing and private donations. The nature of this relationship is con-
sidered in the next section.
PRIVATE DONATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT FINANCING
In addition to accepting private donations, many nonprofit firms
receive funding from government. Government funding comes in many
forms, including lump-sum grants and transfers, tax-exempt use of prop-
erty, and others. Cohodes and Kinkead (1984) discuss the role of govern-
ment in providing capital financing to the nonprofit firm directly, through
grants and transfers; indirectly, through loan guarantees; and implicitly,
by permitting tax exemption, tax-exempt financing, and income tax de-
ductibility of donations. Although they do not emphasize the relationship
between financing and output behavior, they do explain how hospital
financing has changed and suggest ways for it to change in the future.
In terms of magnitude, government financing almost completely
shifted from direct financing to indirect and implicit financing between
the 1940s and the 1980s. Prior to the 1940s, the government had relatively
little involvement in hospital financing. In 1946, the Hill-Burton program
was established, providing direct grants and loans for a rapid increase
in the capacity and modernization of community hospitals. Lave and Lave
(1974) document the effects of this program from its inception until it was
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discontinued in the mid-1970s. Altogether, the Hill-Burton program pro-
vided over four billion dollars of government financing for hospitals.
Since the end of Hill-Burton, direct government grants and transfers have
become a small part of hospital financing.
Indirect financing is accomplished primarily through Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA)-242 loan insurance. FHA backing reduces the
risk associated with loans, and thereby reduces the cost of loans and
increases their availability. Implicit financing is accomplished through the
granting of tax-exempt status to community hospitals. Tax exemption
allows hospitals to sell bonds at lower interest rates and to use land and
buildings without the usual cost of property taxes. It also allows people
to take an income tax deduction on monies donated to hospitals. Because
of the shift from direct financing to indirect and implicit financing, recent
government financing effects on hospital behavior should result from in-
direct and implicit financing. However, most models are based upon di-
rect government financing,.
The literature on government financing is closely linked to the lit-
erature on donations. From a policy perspective, the issue of whether
government financing crowds out donations is very important, affecting




Like much of the literature on firms financed exclusively by private
, 
donations, most discussions of government financing are referring to
&dquo;passive&dquo; firms. Passive firms directly convert funds received into goods
or services. Without undergoing any specified decision process, the firm
provides goods or services in proportion to the total amount of funding
available. An equivalent implied objective of a passive firm could be to
maximize the quantity of goods or services provided, subject to a funding
constraint. Quantity-maximizing firms do have an explicit decision-mak-
ing process, but the simplicity of the process may leave it unmentioned.
For passive firms, only the total level of funding is considered; the
source of funding is not. Essentially, passive firms provide a single prod-
uct. If donors or the government want more services of a specific type,
they simply provide more funds to the appropriate firm. An assumption
that the firm is passive implies that the preferences of the sources of
financing are directly translated into the firms behavior. Given that either
donors or the government can provide funds, and that the behavior of the
firm is the same regardless of the group providing the funds, the issues
are these: does government financing affect donations? and are there op-
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timal conditions of government and donor financing for the provision of
goods and services? Most of the literature in this area concerns the effect
of government financing (usually by direct grants) on donations. These
studies that consider optimal financing conditions, in this case maximum
amounts of financing from government and private sources, are noted.
Roberts (1984) provides a theoretical statement of the relationship
between donors and the government by separately modeling the behavior
of donors and the behavior of the government. Individuals with resources
for donations derive some utility from consumption by certain other per-
sons (e.g., the poor). A noncooperative, marketplace solution to bring
about consumption by the poor is inefficient, since sharing of the cost of
donations (cooperation) could result in a lower price for all donors. An
efficient solution is provided by a costless system of taxation, transfers,
and tax credits for donations where the government acts as an agent to
create cooperation. The result of Roberts’ modeling is a complete (dollar-
for-dollar) crowding-out of private donations by government taxation and
transfers. ’
Roberts’ model of the government implies an inefficient redistri-
bution of funds to the poor with respect to the preferences of the donors.
Since the government taxation-transfer process can be independently af-
fected by the preferences of the donors and the recipients of donations,
a level of transfers to the poor in excess of the noncooperative and simple
government solutions is predicted. The government &dquo;overprovides&dquo; serv-
ices from the perspective of the donors, and private donations disappear.
Real dollar amounts of donations to various recipients during the
depression and from 1955-1982 are presented in support of the results of
theoretical models. In fact, real private donations for direct transfers to
the poor have practically disappeared, and indirect transfers to social
services, health and hospitals, and civic and public organizations have
declined since the early 1970s.
Roberts is certainly not the only author to consider the so-called
crowding-out effect of government financing. Both before and since Rob-
erts’ paper, the issues of the governments subsidization of donations and
of the substitution of government for the private sector have been widely
considered. In recent times the reverse of the crowding-out effect has
been an issue. Underlying many of the federal government policies in the
past few years has been the assumption that if the government does not
provide certain goods or services, then the private sector will respond
and provide these services. Crowding-out, however, may be incomplete,
and its causation may not work in both directions.
In theoretical models with more than two types of goods or more
than two types of people, Schiff (1985) finds that crowding-out does not
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necessarily occur, and more fully specifies conditions under which crowd-
ing-out would be expected. Perfect crowding-out may occur when the
government offers a close substitute, and when donors are just satisfied
or are oversatisfied with the level of services provided.
. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) extend this discussion by look-
ing not only at incremental changes in donations, but at the initial de-
cision to donate or not. In commenting on Roberts and others, they note
that only partial crowding-out is implied since not all persons would be
donors. The tax-transfer system collects from all and therefore the pref-
erences of the donors are subsidized by nondonors, but not fully. Gov-
ernment provision of services implies a tax burden and a redistribution
of wealth. Not only might there be a direct effect of government substi-
tution of private donations, but there might also be a secondary effect of
reducing donations through a reduction in donors’ wealth and a corre-
sponding reduction in income inequity.
Steinberg (1987) begins with the usual crowding-out model asso-
ciated with the public goods approach to government grants, which he
modifies to include local governments and the endogeneity of government
grants. Within the context of a public goods model, an additional private
utility of giving exists separately from the public good provided. In a
political equilibrium where voters make decisions on the basis of the
amount of the public good provided and of the reactions of the donors,
Steinberg shows that it is possible to observe some crowding-out; but it
is expected to be incomplete. And in the context of reversal of direction
of the crowding-out relationship-the expectation of crowding-in that
underlies many recent government actions-donations and local govern-
ments will not fully replace the federal governments funding if it is
withdrawn.
Weiss (1985) takes a game-theoretic approach to this issue and ar-
gues that since the government cannot fully know the preferences of the
people, even with a cooperative solution it is possible that some persons
will be worse off with government provision of funding or services. He
includes a possible reversal of causation of crowding-out. If donors are
dissatisfied with the provision of certain services, they may themselves
donate-and crowd out government programs.
Abrams and Schmitz (1984) examine data from federal tax returns
and find that the level of state government transfers is negatively asso-
ciated with charitable contributions. The coefficients on transfers in their
regression models are statistically significant and imply a crowding-out
effect of approximately 30 percent. Schiff (1985) also finds a 30 percent
crowding-out for state government expenditures and a higher, 60 percent
crowding-out for local government expenditures. Further, government
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spending on welfare programs has a negative effect on private funding
for welfare programs, but general funding has an insignificant effect on
private funding for welfare programs. A conclusion from these empirical
studies is that the crowding-out effect exists and that its magnitude is
related to how closely the government spending is considered to be a
substitute for donations. With respect to Steinbergs consideration of fiscal
federalism, these results would suggest that it is unlikely that decreases
in general government funding would result in a compensating amount
of private donations.
For businesses, which provide a substantial portion of donated funds,
the crowding-in issue is mentioned by Navarro (1988) who includes the
years 1981 and 1982 as dummy variables corresponding to periods of
decreases in government spending. These years are associated with in-
creases in donations, but they do not imply a complete substitution of
donations for government funding. For both businesses and individual
donors, however, it may be that the full effects of crowding-out or crowd-
ing-in occur over a period of several years.
ACTIVE FIRMS
The alternative to a passive firm is an &dquo;active&dquo; firm. Active firms
may have an objective other than strict quantity maximization and may
react to changes in financing and financing sources differently than pas-
sive firms. The behavior of active firms can go beyond providing goods
and services to include soliciting donations and deciding which clients
receive the output of the firm and how the output is produced. Many of
the models of active firms are based upon the general behavioral models
discussed earlier.
Steinberg (1986) investigates the behavior of the firm with respect
to donations and decisions on expenditures for fund-raising efforts,
administration, and provision of services. Funds are received exoge-
nously and generated endogenously as a result of the decisions of the firm
with regard to these expenditures. The aim of Steinbergs model is to
establish a test of whether nonprofit firms are budget or quantity-of-
service maximizers. Firms are budget maximizers if they solicit donations
until the marginal return-the return on the last dollar spent on solici-
tations-is zero. If firms solicit funds until the net return-the total return
on all dollars spent on solicitation is zero-they are quantity-of-service
maximizers, since this results in the greatest amount of funds available
for expenditures on services.
Steinbergs empirical investigation is interpreted to imply that health
firms (mostly hospitals) are budget maximizers-an admitted surprise
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to Steinberg given his impression of the existence of competition in
health care markets. The small percentage of funds received through do-
nations and lack of price sensitivity on the part of third party payers are
provided as explanations for this result. A more thorough explanation is
readily apparent given the time period of the data, 1974-1976. In the pre-
prospective payment era (pre-1983), a lack of price sensitivity on the part
of third party payers was explicit in the cost-based system of reimburse-
ment. Expenditures for fund-raising efforts, administration, and provi-
sion of services were fully reimbursed. With full cost reimbursement, the
result of a marginal return of zero is equivalent to a zero net rate of
return. A further implication of cost-based reimbursement is the lack of
any incentive to solicit funds in the first place. Imperfections in the reim-
bursement system and unsolicited donations are two explanations for
observing any donations in this time period.
Unfortunately, Steinberg does not examine the effect of exogenously
received funds, possibly received from the government, although he in-
cludes them in his model. But as he notes, the crowding-out effect in
firms that select fund-raising efforts has not yet been considered. For
either budget- or quantity-maximizing firms, the receipt of exogenous
funds presumably furthers the goal of the firm and is not said to affect
decisions. The presence of government funds affects firms’ output indi-
rectly through the reactions of donors in the passive models, and directly
in this and other active models.
Rose-Ackerman (1983) examines the government spending-donations
relationship by including matching programs, the &dquo;strings&dquo; that come
with government grants, and the resulting change in the behavior of the
nonprofit firm. She modifies the neoclassical private goods, passive,
crowding-out model by considering five factors: economies of scale,
asymmetric information, endogenous ideologies, complementarities among
the various goods, and matching grants. Each of these factors can lead to
increases or decreases in observed crowding-out.
Rose-Ackermans discussion differs from others in its explicit inclu-
sion of the behavior of the firm. This is most clear in the discussion of
endogenous ideologies. Deciding what exactly to produce (or whom to
help) is made by the firm and is influenced both by government demands
and the response of donors. The government, for example, may require
a specific behavior in return for a grant. If this behavior matches the
preferences of the firm and donors, the grant may be accepted and do-
nations may increase. If the grant does not match the firms’ and donors’
preferences, the grant may be rejected or donations may decrease. In
either case, the firm makes the final decision on the output produced.
Sloan, Morrisey, Cotter, et al. (1986) model the hospital with par-
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ticular attention given to its efforts to solicit donations. They assume that
crowding-out occurs from the donors perspective. That is, the mere ex-
istence of government funding causes people to provide fewer (or smaller)
donations. Along with other factors, they examine ways in which the quan-
tity of the hospitals output will change with the existence of government
funding. The theoretical result is ambiguous because of the assumption
of crowdihg-out. If the magnitude of the crowding-out is assumed to be
negligible, then the result of receiving government funding is an increase
in output. This comes about because of the positive effect that increasing
output will have on stimulating donations and because of the decrease
in the cost of soliciting donations.
Empirically, in a slight simplification of the theoretical model, Sloan,
Morrisey, Cotter, et al. find that government grants of the matching type
(Hill-Burton) have the effect of increasing donations. They do not find a
significant relationship between the tax rate and donations, but this may
be due to the level of aggregation of their data.
Our review of the various papers on crowding-out shows that
crowding-out exists and that its magnitude depends on the type of gov-
ernment financing, the preferences of donors, and the actions of the firm.
Government financing that requires matching funds increases donations,
and financing that donors view as a substitute for private financing serves
to reduce donations to some extent. If the firm is active, it can work to
counteract or exacerbate the effects of crowding-out. It appears unlikely
that decreasing government financing results in offsetting private dona-
tions. Decreases in government financing result in decreases in hospital
financing.
Financing in terms of the tax-exempt status of hospitals is consid-
ered by Herzlinger and Krasker (1987), and by various authors in the
recent report by the Institute of Medicine (1986). Because many of these
latter discussions are inseparably linked with comparisons of nonprofit
and for-profit firms, and not with examinations of the source of financing
per se, they are included only to the extent that they consider the effects
of government financing on hospital behavior. In the context of comparing
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, an inevitable question is, what
does the government receive in return for its subsidy of NFP hospitals?
It has been suggested that favorable tax status in an otherwise competitive
market allows NFP hospitals to offer services that might otherwise be
unprofitable, or to treat.sicker patients, or to offer higher-quality care.
Rather than dictating behavior, tax exemption not associated with specific
requirements may allow a flexibility that permits a socially beneficial
range of behavior.
Herzlinger and Krasker argue that the suggested benefits are not
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realized and provide empirical evidence to support their argument. Sev-
eral letters to the editor in subsequent issues of the Harvard Business
Review cast serious doubts on their data and conclusions. What is dear,
however, is that tax exemption does permit more discretionary behavior
than the usual sources of debt and equity financing. What hospitals de-
cide to do, given choices, is still an open question.
The key word here with regard to behavior is ’permit: Without
requirements to meet in return for its tax-exempt status, it is possible
that the NFP hospital can either behave or not behave as society would
like hospitals to behave. The policy implication of this discussion is fo-
cused on whether or not NFP hospitals should retain their tax-exempt
status. In accordance with the theme of this review, an alternative issue
would be whether or not specific requirements should be made by the
government. A discussion of this issue has not yet occurred.
HOSPITAL PROFITS AS
FINANCING
In contrast to the previously cited papers, some studies recognize
that many nonprofit firms have mixed missions linked to the source of
financing. More specifically, nonprofit firms are modeled as composites
of commercial firms that provide services to paying clients and firms that
provide social or public goods. The work reviewed in this section con-
siders the role of the profits earned from paying clients (commercial fi-
nancing) in subsidizing the provision of services to those who cannot
pay or the provision of other public goods. Public goods may be pur-
chased by donations in the current period and may be returns to dona-
tions made in previous time periods.
Posnett and Sandler (1986) focus on the optimizing behavior of do-
nors to show that using profits earned from paying clients to subsidize
the provision of public goods can be an effective fund-raising mechanism.
While many of the conclusions from their model are similar to those from
other models of cross-subsidization and cost shifting, the introduction of
fund-raising makes a connection to financing not found in some of the
papers discussed earlier.
In Posnett and Sandlers model, customers purchase private goods
from a passive nonprofit firm. Since a portion of the purchase price is
directed toward the provision of public goods, private and public goods
are jointly supplied. If the nonprofit firm has no cost advantage over
profit-maximizing firms, the price of the joint good provided by the non-
profit firm is higher than the price of the good provided by profit-
maximizing firms. However, cross-subsidization may still be an effective
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fund-raising tool if the value attached to the public component of output
is higher than its implicit price. Cross-subsidization also works in the
absence of competition for clients and when some clients have inelastic
demand because of insurance coverage (Harris 1979).
If the nonprofit firm does have a cost advantage, the benefits of
joint supply are increased. Under these circumstances, the nonprofit firm
can supply the good at the competitive price and produce public goods
with the surplus. In addition to obtaining revenues from customers who
value public good output, donations can be obtained from individuals
who derive no utility from increases in the output of the public good.
. 
Most other authors model an active nonprofit firm in which the NFP
firm is a composite of a commercial and a public firm. The roles of output
in attracting donations and of donations in producing public good output
are examined. James (1983) models an active nonprofit firm that is a
hybrid of business enterprise and government yet differs from each. Be-
cause the manager selects the quantity of two outputs, his or her pref-
erences determine the type and quantity of output of the firm. This firm
receives direct lump-sum donations and donations earmarked specifically
for the purchase of current output. Some of the outputs that the manager
prefers are public goods and may not be profitable. When the supply of
funds is limited, the nonprofit firm subsidizes the production of services
that lose money with moneymaking outputs that the manager prefers less
or even dislikes. Thus, cross-subsidization is a deliberate long-term man-
agement strategy for funding the consumption of unprofitable (loss-mak-
ing) outputs that managers care about most.
James evaluates the response of the nonprofit firm to changes in
lump-sum donations for operations and changes in the prices of outputs.
When the firm receives a lump-sum donation, it increases the output of
the services that managers prefer and decreases the output of services
that they do not like. Similarly, when the competitively determined price
of a desirable service increases, its output increases. If the price of a
disliked service increases, the output of the desirable service again in-
creases. Although James does not evaluate the effect, per unit of output,
of a change in the donation, the fact that the sum of price, donations, and
government grants per unit is multiplied by the quantity of each output
produced makes a change in this type of donation analogous to a change
in price.
Long (1976, 1982a,b), Conrad (1984), and Silvers and Kauer (1986)
link the appropriate output behavior of the NFP hospital to its long-term
financing, and to donations in particular. They, too, envision the NFP
firm as a firm that provides private and public goods. Since the capital
contributions of the &dquo;ownership&dquo; could be committed to an alternative
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opportunity, the return provided by the nonprofit hospital must be at
least as great as that provided by the next best alternative. The next best
alternative is the return on the risk-adjusted (Conrad 1984) market port-
folio adjusted downward to account for the tax subsidy of donations (Sil-
. vers and Kauer 1986; see also Sloan, et al. 1988). Competitive returns to
/ equity capital suppliers (donors, but sometimes also taxpayers who sup-
) ply funds for government grants, and customers who pay more than the
; economic cost of services; see Long 1976) are in the form of nonpecuniary
dividends to the community-unreimbursed education and research ex-
penditures,.charity care, and the like.
If the returns provided by the nonprofit hospital are not at least as
great as the adjusted market return, donors will invest in the market and
will use the return to purchase the social goods directly. &dquo;At the margin,
the equity investor is indifferent between supplying capital to a for-profit
enterprise, where it yields an after-tax stream of dividends and capital
gains, and to a not-for-profit firm, where the gains are in non-money
terms&dquo; (Conrad 1984, 44). Consequently, to ensure that capital will be
supplied in the future, the nonprofit hospital must provide returns to the
equity capital suppliers. To provide the required returns, profits are used
during the time period in which they are generated to produce these
community dividends (social and public goods); thus, current-period
profits on private goods are used to subsidize public goods.
Long (1982a,b) also illustrates how nonprofit hospitals with their
dual role cross-subsidize public outputs with private profits by seeking
an overall-neutral net present value (NPV) portfolio of activities. He says
that the board should make specific decisions regarding the provision of
social goods, the not-for-profit analogy to authorizing dividends in a for-
profit corporation. Since the role of the not-for-profit firm is to preserve
capital (as opposed to creating or consuming capital), each profit-making
service should be altered to be a zero NPV project. This is done by paying
dividends or by reducing prices. Although he finds no fault with cross-
subsidization of social goods by private goods, Long feels that nonprofit
firms should not cross-subsidize services to paying patients.
By providing social returns-community dividends-the long-run
survival of the organization is enhanced, because it maintains its ability
to attract new infusions of donor capital. Long, like Posnett and Sandler,
recognizes that donors may value the output of social goods differently
than the dollar price or cost of such goods. In this case, the provider
captures an economic &dquo;externality&dquo;; its value is measured by the extent
to which perceived value exceeds out-of-pocket cost. The provider may
receive an even greater value if donors perceive social value (e.g., im-
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proved productivity or longer life) that exceeds the accounting cost or
charges of the care given.
In contrast, Pauly (1986) claims that often no relationship exists
between output and financing-specifically, from donations-in the be-
havior of the nonprofit hospital. According to his model, initial donations
are received as the result of fund-raising efforts; apparently, donors are
not promised any pecuniary or nonpecuniary returns by the fund-raising
pleas. It is difficult to believe his contention that it is not useful to examine
the reasons why people donate, especially when he models the nonprofit
firm as a totally commercial firm. He provides no justification of the initial
donations even though, at this initial level of output, output is provided
only to commercial customers. Pauly does acknowledge that to elicit do-
nations beyond the initial contributions, something must be promised to
the donors. These benefits may simply be engraved plaques, or they may
be social goods; he concludes that the amount required is an empirical
question. Pauly does not, however, suggest that the nonprofit firm pro-
vides any significant level of social good output.
Most of the papers discussed above view profits as necessary for
NFPs because they are used to provide social goods during the period in
which they are earned. Whether NFP firms should keep profits as re-
tained earnings has not been addressed as thoroughly. Wedig, Sloan,
Hassan, et al. (1988) note that increasing profits may come at the expense
of providing additional services. Although it may be efficient to retain
some earnings to decrease the costs of new fund-raising, Silvers and
Kauer (1986) question the appropriateness of retained earnings. Retaining
earnings eliminates the opportunity for donors to receive a tax subsidy
on new contributions. Pauly (1986) believes that the opportunity cost of
forced contributions from paying customers is higher than the return on
a market portfolio of assets. It is, therefore, inappropriate for NFPs to
retain earnings, especially when voluntarily donated capital is cheap. In
a later work (Pauly 1987b), he does state that the exact relationship be-
tween returns and donations is an unresolved empirical issue. In contrast
to these authors, Long (1976) argues that accounting profits (retained
earnings) must be positive to ensure a return of capital. If no earnings
are retained, the NFP hospital will be unable to continue providing serv-
ices in the future; it will also be unable to provide the return on equity
(social goods) required by equity suppliers.
The model of the normative behavior of NFP firms that we agree
with frames our consideration of two policy issues mentioned earlier: (1)
whether NFP hospitals should retain their tax-exempt status and (2)
whether NFPs should earn profits from reimbursers. If reimbursers do
include reimbursement for equity capital, should NFPs use this profit
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contemporaneously to provide public goods or should they retain some
or all of it as retained earnings for future use?
Whether NFP hospitals should keep their tax-exempt status is re-
lated to the mix of commercial (private) and social-goods output. The
answer to this dilemma is linked to the sources of financing if social
goods are purchased or subsidized with private-goods profits in the same
period (James 1983; Posnett and Sandler 1986) or if social goods are com-
munity dividends (Long 1976, 1982a,b; Conrad z1984; Silvers and Kauer
1986).
Merely providing some level of social-goods output, however, is not
a sufficient response. Major policy questions remain concerning the
amount required in production of social goods. Moreover, we do not
know how these goods should be valued; should their value be measured
at the price charged or at the full or marginal cost of producing them? In
addition, we do not know if the value of these goods related to the level
of equity should equal the return on the market portfolio of assets ad-
justed for risk (Conrad 1984) and tax benefits (Silvers and Kauer 1986).
Or, is there an additional perceived benefit that allows NFP hospitals to
return less in dollar terms (Posnett and Sandler 1986; Long 1982a,b)? By
measuring the output appropriately, managers can be made accountable
to the financing sources and can justify the continued tax-exempt status
of NFP hospitals. (For a review of the finance literature regarding conflicts
between managers and equity suppliers, see Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet
1985.)
Another policy issue concerns whether third party payers should
pay a return on equity to NFP hospitals either directly or incorporated
in a price to NFP hospitals. If the normative models by Posnett and
Sandler, James, Long, Conrad, and Silvers and Kauer, reviewed in this
section, are accurate depictions of reality, then profits increase social goods
output. When the price for private goods is not set sufficiently high, or
when a return on equity is not explicitly paid to donor capital suppliers,
the nonprofit firm does not provide these nonpecuniary benefits. Conrad
(1984) argues that the declining availability of donations for hospitals
shows that the cost of equity capital for nonprofit hospitals is not zero;
donors have not been compensated for their opportunity costs. In addi-
tion, he claims that failure to provide a return on equity shifts the pay-
ment of that return to debt by increasing the amount, and therefore the
riskiness, of debt in the NFP firms capital structure.
If a return on equity is to be paid, the amount should be the return
required by equity capital suppliers. Paying this amount ensures that
,new infusions of equity capital will be forthcoming. However, as noted
previously, the required return and whether some of the return should
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be in the form of retained earnings are unresolved issues. Only after that
debate is settled can the form of payment (e.g., cost based, folded into
prospective payments) be addressed.
DEBT FINANCING
Very little work concerning the effects of long-term debt financing
is available in the health care literature. Rather, this literature examines
the relationship between investment and operating costs, but not the
effect of capital financing on investment or output (Anderson, Erickson,
and Feigenbaum 1987; Ashby 1984; Sloan and Steinwald 1980a,b; Bent-
kover, Sloan, Feeley, et al. 1984; Dunkelburg, Furst, Roenfeldt 1983).
Most of the finance literature concerning debt concentrates on whether
the presence of debt in the capital structure affects the value of the firm
and, consequently, whether there is an optimal capital structure (Taggart
1981; Titman and Wessels 1988; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984). (Recently,
Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, et al. [1988] have shed some light on this issue for
hospitals.) When perfect capital markets exist, the investment decision
can be separated from the financing decision. The literature examines
whether financing source affects the value of the firm given the decision
to invest. The key concern, however, is not with changes in investment
or output, but with the amount of debt. Debt is relevant because larger
amounts are believed to increase bankruptcy costs, to create tax benefits,
or to provide signals to the market regarding nonpublic information.
A more recent part of the finance literature examines the effect of
capital market imperfections on the firms actions. Market imperfections
generate agency problems, which occur when individuals (principals)
delegate decision making to agents and information regarding the agents’
behavior is imperfect. Conflicts of interest among the principals and agents
occur when principals and agents act in their self-interest and each forms
rational expectations regarding future wealth. Costly financial contracts
and various debt instruments that resolve these actual and potential con-
flicts are also examined in this literature. We review the literature con-
cerning conflicts between bondholders and equity holders of for-profit
firms, illustrating how resolution of such conflicts may affect the output
of the nonprofit hospital. (We ignore the existence of conflicts between
managers and equity holders because they are not directly linked to fi-
nancing.) Although this finance literature rarely (if ever) directly ad-
dresses firms’ decisions regarding the output of the firm, output is




Debt financing in circumstances where shareholders are not re-
sponsible for the liabilities of the firm generates incentives for equity
holders to accept high-risk projects, causing a transfer of wealth from
bondholders to equity holders and incentives for equity holders to forgo
new positive net present value (value-adding) investments. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) describe how stockholders may expropriate the wealth of
bondholders by increasing the risk of the firm. If stockholders issue debt
to invest in a low-variance project (a low-risk project), they can alter the
division of wealth from the project between bondholders and sharehold-
ers by investing instead in a high-variance (high-risk) project. This action
lowers the value of debt because the new project is riskier and has a lower
market value. The incentive for stockholders to do this can be understood
by comparing equity to an option (technically a European call option) to
buy back the entire firm from debt holders at the face value of the debt
(Galai and Masulis 1976). The value of such an option increases with the
variance (risk) of the cash flows generated by the underlying assets (Black
and Scholes 1973). Thus, by switching to the higher-risk project, share-
holders increase the value of their equity claims while decreasing the
value of debt.
Once debt has been issued, stockholders have an incentive to ignore
some profitable investments (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Bar-
nea, Haugen and Senbet 1981). When debt is supported entirely by future
investment opportunities, only those investments that have a net present
value greater than the debt payment will be accepted. Thus, some positive
net present value (NPV) projects will be rejected. Since the value of the
firm can be divided into the value of assets already in place and the
present value of the firms options to make future investments, a loss in
firm value occurs (Myers 1977). Suboptimal investment may also occur
when debt is issued against currently held assets (Bodie and Taggart
1978). New investments may not be made because some of the benefit
partially accrues to bondholders in the form of a reduced default
probability.
The conflict between bondholders and stockholders is particularly
relevant to equity holders of nonprofit firms, because these equity holders
are not motivated by monetary wealth maximization. If they value output
of public goods, equity holders of the nonprofit firm will be especially
prone to invest in projects that are risky for bondholders or to under-
invest in positive NPV- projects. While it is possible for some bond-
holders to derive a degree of satisfaction from the provision of goods and
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services in lieu of interest and principle payments, this is not likely to be
the general case.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Acting on the basis of self-interest and rational expectations regard-
ing the potential behavior of equity holders, bondholders try to ensure
repayment by altering the behavior of equity holders (bond issuers) in
one or more of _ the following ways: (1) they write and monitor costly
contracts (covenants); (2) they require bond insurance; or (3) they invest
in debt instruments with certain characteristics.
B ond Covenants
Bond ratings are determined by the various rating agencies and are
a leading determinant of the price (and, consequently, the interest rate)
of the bond. Ratings are determined by examining the firms operational
history and monitoring current conditions of the firm and the market-
place. These historical and current data are used by rating agencies as
predictors of future performance. Alternatively stated, the rating agencies
assume either that the behavior of the firm will not change, or that any
changes in behavior will be consistent with past behavior.
For some potential or actual bondholders, the predictors of perfor-
mance used by the rating agencies may be insufficient inducements to
buy or hold bonds. The available latitude of the behavior of the managers
of the firm may be interpreted as involving more risk than the rating
agencies predict. For these bondholders, guarantees may be required.
Covenants are essentially guarantees on firm behavior. They are rules for
selected activities of the firm and are also a determinant of the price of
the bond. Hospitals issuing bonds may be required to maintain a spec-
ified debt service coverage ratio, maintain the facilities financed, pledge
gross revenues to the repayment of the bond, not issue more debt, and
the like (Baker 1985).
Through restricting the firm from activities that it would otherwise
undertake, covenants can have an effect on firm behavior and perfor-
mance. From the standpoint of the firm, covenants involve writing, mon-
itoring, bonding, and enforcement costs, but may raise the price of the
issue (decrease interest expenses) enough to cover costs (Kidwell, Soren-
sen, Wachowicz 1987).
The classic reference on bond covenants is Smith and Warners (1979)
description and analysis of the many problems of bondholder-stockholder
conflict and the ways in which covenants are used as one mechanism to
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reduce this conflict. In particular, the study examines the covenants writ-
ten to control four sources of conflict between bondholders and share-
holders : (1) dividend payment, (2) claim dilution, (3) asset substitution,
and (4) underinvestment. Bondholders are interested in ensuring that in-
creases in dividends do not come at the expense of investment, which
would lower bond values. Bondholders’ claims are diluted and bond val-
ues decline when additional debt of the same or higher priority is issued.
Substitution of higher variance/risk projects (assets) than those for which
the bonds were originally issued lowers bond values as well. Finally, the
value of bonds already issued falls when shareholders reject positive net
present value projects because some of the benefits accrue to the
bondholders.
Smith and Warner analyze data on 87 randomly selected public debt
issues during 1974-1975. They find support for the hypothesis that there
is a unique set of optimal financial contracts that maximizes the value of
the firm. Specifically, covenants restrict the firms (1) production-invest-
ment policy (35 percent of issues examined); (2) payment of dividends
(23 percent of issues); (3) subsequent financing policy (91 percent of is-
sues) ; (4) pattern of payoffs to bondholders; and (5) bonding activities.
For example, firms under covenant agree not to sell certain assets, not to
finance dividends by issuing additional stock or debt, or not to issue
securities with higher priority; they may set up sinking funds for debt
payments. All of these provisions are costly to the firm.
- 
Brauer (1981) and Roberts and Viscione (1984) report that use of
restrictive covenants increases bond prices (decreases interest expenses).
Malitz (1986) attempts to explain the determinants and benefits of cove-
nants by examining sinking-fund, dividend, and debt covenants on de-
bentures issued from 1960-1980. She finds that a sinking-fund provision
is the most frequent covenant, and that smaller firms, firms with high
leverage positions, and firms that do not have longstanding debt issues
in the market (meaning that there is less information about their history
of expropriation of wealth) are most likely to benefit from covenants and
to use them. Multiple discriminant analysis indicates that these factors
correctly predict 82 percent of firms’ covenants.
Thus, covenants, which resolve some conflicts between bondholders
and shareholders, decrease interest expenses for firms by guaranteeing
the behavior of the firm. Covenants may also change the behavior of NFP
firms in several ways. First, bond covenants may restrict the ability of the
NFP firm to invest in negative NPV projects that provide social benefits.
Covenants are written partially to restrict investment in high-risk projects
and to encourage investment in positive NPV projects. In addition, since
cash flows must be maintained to meet debt service, NFP firms with debt
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may be less likely to provide charity care (payment of dividends). They
may, however, increase their output of private goods. We know of no
studies that have examined changes in firms’ patterns of financing or
behavior because of covenants.
Bond Insurance
Bond insurance, or &dquo;credit enhancement,&dquo; improves the rating of the
bond, perhaps providing access to AA or AAA credit ratings. The use of
insurance for hospital bonds is increasing. In 1985, 40 percent of tax-
exempt health care bond issues were covered by insurance, compared to
27 percent in 1984. According to Claibom (1985), relatively few firms (two
to three) do most of the insuring, and they also have restrictive covenants.
The Federal Housing Administration also offers insurance, often with
fewer restrictions than other underwriters. Insurance, if thoughtfully pur-
chased, is bought when the costs of the insurance and attached covenants
outweigh the additional interest costs paid for bonds without these pro-
visions. For a fee, insurance transfers the risk of default to the insurer.
Due to the transfer of risk, the existence of insurance can affect firm
behavior.
Insurance policies containing covenants will affect hospital output
behavior in the manner just described. If covenants are not included, the
insurance may stimulate additional risk-taking by the hospital. Again, as
with covenants, we know of no studies that have examined changes in
behavior due to the presence of insurance, nor have we found any studies
that evaluate the tradeoffs between covenants and insurance.
Financial Instruments
Complex financial instruments may be necessary because markets
cannot provide complete and costless solutions to agency problems. &dquo;In
principle it would be possible for bondholders, by the inclusion of various
covenants in the indenture provisions, to limit managerial behavior which
results in reductions in the value of bonds&dquo; (Jensen and Meckling 1976,
337). Unfortunately, complete protection would require extremely detailed
contracts that would be prohibitively expensive to write and monitor.
Bondholders write covenants up to the point where the real marginal
costs equal perceived marginal benefits. Beyond that point, agency prob-
lems can be controlled with various types of debt instruments. Bamea,
Haugen, and Senbet (1980), Allen, Lamy, and Thompson (1987), Stultz
and Johnson (1985), and Thatcher (1985) show how certain characteristics
of debt instruments can resolve bondholder-shareholder conflicts.
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Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) illustrate how call provisions
and maturity structures can resolve agency problems associated with risk
incentives and forgone growth opportunities. They show that risk-shifting
may be eliminated by adding a call provision to the bonds. If the price
at which the option may be exercised is set appropriately, decreases in
the value of the shareholders’ call option caused by decreases in the value
of debt more than offset any increases in shareholder claims resulting
from risk-shifting.
They also discuss the resolution of the underinvestment problem
both when debt matures after the future investment is made and when
debt is entirely supported by a growth opportunity. They extend Bodie
and Taggarts (1978) analysis, which ignores interest rate uncertainty and
tax considerations, to resolve the agency problems. Here stockholders do
not capture all the benefits of the investment; some accrue to the bond-
holders because the probability of default declines. Attaching a call pro-
vision so that managers can recall the debt at a stated price when the new
investment decision is made counters some of the agency cost. Although
this strategy may not restore the value of the firm to that of the all-equity
financing case, issuance of callable debt is preferred by all firms over
noncallable debt. It eliminates the need to write detailed covenants that
try to specify the investment strategy in advance and to set up an elab-
orate monitoring system.
Allen, Lamy, and Thompson (1987), however, show that firms pay
a price for short call periods. As the length of call protection increases,
yields decrease. The same is not true of additional years of refunding
protection. Bondholders do not believe that firms will not use other funds
to call bonds and then issue new bonds. The bondholders are exposed to
more interest rate risk if bonds are refunded early, because the rate they
can earn when they reinvest their bond proceeds may be lower than the
rate paid on their initial investment.
The underinvestment problem can be solved by financing new in-
vestment projects with secured debt (Stulz and Johnson 1985). Share-
holders can sell the new bondholders a larger claim to the payoffs of the
new investment and thereby reduce the transfer of wealth to existing
bondholders when new investment occurs. Thatcher (1985) demonstrates
empirically that firm characteristics that are proxies for high agency costs
(e.g., a high debt-to-assets ratio) are associated with use of the option of
early redemption. The flexibility of this option reduces the agency costs
of debt associated with underinvestment and risk-shifting. Thus, bond-
holders act to increase the likelihood of repayment through altering the
characteristics of financial instruments as well as by writing covenants
and requiring issuing firms to purchase bond insurance.
282
As described above, the addition of debt financing can affect the
behavior of the NFP firm. These behavioral changes have implications
for policy questions regarding whether NFP hospitals should issue debt,
whether they should be reimbursed for the costs of debt, and whether
that debt should be tax-exempt. Debt financing may move the behavior
of NFP hospitals away from the provision of social goods, such as charity
care, which are risky projects in the bondholders’ view, and toward the
provision of private outputs. It may also lead NFP hospitals away from
negative NPV projects that provide social goods over a longer period of
time because, from the bondholders’ perspective, covenants and debt
instruments resolve the underinvestment problem.
Wilson, Sheps, and Oliver (1982) argue that issuing debt increases
the cost of care for reimbursers. However, they have been roundly criti-
cized for ignoring the opportunity costs of equity (Foster 1983). Their
argument actually focuses on additional costs of care to reimbursers be-
cause hospitals feel compelled to keep occupancy rates high and produce
additional private outputs. Yet, since the return required on equity capital
is still a matter of much debate, it may in fact be cheaper to use equity
. financing. Although Pauly (1986), for example, argues that the cost of
retained earnings, or &dquo;forced contributions&dquo; is quite high, he claims that
the cost of voluntary donations is low. In addition, the return required
on equity is reduced by the tax benefits of donations and, perhaps, by
any perceived extra social benefits. Until such debates are resolved, pol-
icymakers cannot determine whether NFPs should issue debt and whether
they should encourage the use of debt through reimbursement of debt
costs (Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, et al. 1988) or lack of reimbursement for
equity costs (Conrad 1984).
On the other hand, issuing more debt increases the risk for equity
holders, thereby increasing their required return. Equity holders for NFP
firms may be especially sensitive to risk changes because they cannot sell
their &dquo;shares&dquo; in a secondary capital market; thus, a return may also be
required to compensate them for liquidity restrictions.
The papers reviewed in this section do not discuss the tax exemption
of NFP debt. Tax exemption lowers the cost of debt to firms. Bondholders
accept a lower return because they are not required to pay income taxes
on interest income. As a result, tax-exempt debt may cause less deviation
from the social good output preferences of equity holders. There may be
less need to produce private outputs that create positive NPVs relative to
those produced when debt is taxable. On the other hand, the lower cost
of tax-exempt debt may increase the total amount of debt. Debt financing
will be encouraged, especially if equity costs are higher than debt costs.
Although most of these studies do not discuss health care firms directly,
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they do provide a conceptual basis from which to begin analyzing some
important policy questions for NFP health care firms.
CONCLUSION
An understanding of the effects of various financing options on not-
for-profit hospital behavior is important if public policy in this area is
to be well formulated. This review has examined the sources of financing
available to not-for-profit hospitals, and it has considered relationships
between financing and the output of the hospital that might shed light
on public policy.
Although we have reviewed a large number of papers from a wide
variety of sources, it is clear that research to date has not solved, or in
some cases even addressed, the many concerns and issues important to
hospital financing. Should the tax deductibility of donations be allowed
or extended? Would decreases in government financing-direct, indirect,
or implicit-be replaced by private donations? Is there an appropriate
policy to guide the profitability of hospitals, or to direct their retained
earnings? And should tax exemption of hospital debt offerings, or the
general tax-exempt status of hospitals, be continued? The literature has
made inroads into each of these questions, but the answers are far from
clear. 
’
The literature suggests that the supply of donations is sensitive to
prices, and that crowding-out and -in are only partial. Tax deductibility
is certainly an important factor in determining the amount of donations.
Government provision of financing reduces private financing, but re-
moval of government financing is not expected to be associated with fully
compensating increases in private donations. These findings indicate a
role for the government in the financing of at least the public goods aspects
of hospitals. However, the nature of the returns required by donors and
the optimal levels of government financing remain to be examined.
Along related lines, the earning of profits by the not-for-profit hos-
pital has long been debated. Profit potential enables cross subsidization
of some patients. Cross subsidization may or may not be an appropriate
role for NFP hospitals, but it is a role that they have assumed for much
of their history-and a role consistent with some theories of the NFP
firm. The existence of retained earnings does imply that some opportun-
ities to provide additional charity care or another social good have been
forgone, presumably in exchange for the ability to provide more in the
future. The appropriateness of using these retained earnings for long-term
financing has not been fully explored.
. Tax-exempt debt allows hospitals to use the debt market, which
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otherwise might not be available at a reasonable price given the compe-
tition of for-profit firms in the ordinary debt market. The use of debt
frequently involves direct restrictions on hospital behavior, through cove-
nants, or indirect restrictions, through insurance or contracting provi-
sions. The extent to which behavior is actually restricted or changed has
not been investigated. While there is much speculation that hospitals
have been diverted from their missions with the increase in debt financ-
ing, this has not been shown through empirical research. Policies that
restrict tax-exempt debt should be based on an understanding of the
effects of debt financing. Such an understanding does not yet exist.
Before these important empirical questions can be researched, the-
oretical models of the relationship between financing and output must
be improved. Little theoretical work that integrates donor motivations
with active firm behavior has been pursued (Rose-Ackerman 1982; Pauly
1987a). Since financing is expected to affect output, and output to affect
financing, the role of the return expected by donors must be explicitly
modeled. Although Long (1976), Conrad (1984), Silvers and Kauer (1986),
and Pauly (1986) address this issue, they present conflicting and incom-
plete arguments. For example, questions concerning whether donors at-
tach extra nonmonetary value to social outputs, whether there are conflicts
between donors and managers, and the role of retained earnings are
discussed incompletely or not at all. Moreover, none of the authors of the
papers reviewed is careful to separate types of donations. It is likely that
donors give to purchase output in the current period, to contribute lump-
sum amounts for operations in the current period, or to invest in the firm
for future periods. These types of donations must be distinguished if
return rates are to be determined accurately. Finally, the role of debt fi-
nancing is discussed only to a limited degree. The full ramifications of
debt financing on behavior have yet to be modeled.
We have attempted to highlight those areas that clearly call for future
research, but we expect that the research community will not be limited
to our ideas and will find new and innovative approaches to the issues.
Much of the literature on hospital financing is very recent and expanding
rapidly. The advancement of this literature, it is hoped, will lead to more
informed financing policy.
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